rent academic year, by addressing several recommendations from the final report of the ACLS Commission on Cyberinfrastructure, released in 2006.

[1] http://digilib.bu.edu/mission/

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Hermeneutic Network: Toward an Approach to Analysis and Design of Intentional Systems

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'I felt that I should be able to get the computer to sound good more or less on its own, so that someone listening to it says, "Who is that playing?" But if you get "What's that?" instead, you have to go back to the drawing board.' (Lewis, 2000)

Abstract

igital information technologies are increasingly being adopted in the humanities as both research tools and supports for new forms of cultural expression. Some of these digital technologies, in particular artificial intelligence (AI) programs, exhibit complex behaviors usually seen as the territory of intentional human phenomena, such as creativity, planning and learning. This paper identifies a prototypical subset of these programs, which we name intentional systems, and argues that their seemingly intentional behaviors are not the sole effect of underlying algorithmic complexity and knowledge engineering practices from computer science. In contrast, we argue (paralleling the field of software studies) that intentional systems, and digital systems at large, need to be analyzed as a contemporary form of historically, culturally, socially, and technically situated texts. Perception of system intentionality arises from a network of continuous meaning exchange between system authors' narration and users' interpretation processes embedded in a broader social context. The central contribution of this paper is a new interdisciplinary analytical framework called the AI hermeneutic network that is informed by traditions of hermeneutic analysis, actor-network theory, cognitive semantics theory, and philosophy of mind. To illustrate the design implication of the AI hermeneutic network, we present our recent work Memory, Reverie Machine, an expressive intentional system that generates interactive narratives rich with daydreaming sequences.

Intentional Systems

Trombonist and composer George Lewis's above de-

scription of his interactive musical system Voyager exemplifies a growing number of digital systems, such as the autonomous painting program AARON (Cohen 2002) and recent computational narrative works (Harrell 2006; Mateas & Stern 2002; PŽrez y PŽrez & Aliseda 2006), that utilize AI techniques in pursuit of cultural expression. Decades after heated debates about the feasibility of AI, the question of whether computers may one day possess human-level intelligence no longer spurs society's fear and curiosity. Instead, systems are designed to encourage users to make sense of them as intentional and independent entities. Compared to instrumental, production-oriented programs such as the PhotoShop, these systems display intentional behaviors related to human mental phenomena such as planning, learning, narrating, and creating, as if their actions were about something in the world (Searle 1983) rather than mere execution of algorithmic rules. Lewis, for instance, insists that Voyager 'not [be] treated as a musical instrument, but as an independent improviser.' He deliberately designed the system to display independent behaviors arising from its own internal processes that even its designer cannot fully anticipate. The improvisational dialogue between Voyager and the musicians, Lewis emphasizes, is 'bi-directional transfer of intentionality through sound.' computational complexity, 2) process opacity, 3) human-like coherent behaviors, and 4) execution of authorial intention. The term encompasses not only AI systems but also AI-like systems that exist either outside of computer science communities or are not described by their authors as AI systems for ideological or other reasons. Critical analysis and design of intentional systems, like information technologies at large in the digital humanities, calls for the recognition of these systems as important forms of cultural production, beyond their traditionally instrumentalized, productivity oriented roles.

Intentional Systems as Texts

Although generally used to describe written forms of discourse, the term text as the object of literary theory and modern hermeneutics is not confined to only linguistic forms. In his essay on the literary text, German philosopher Manfred Frank (Frank 1989) criticizes the notion that meanings that authors encode within texts can be objectively retrieved without distortion by readers given appropriate methods of interpretation (Hirsch 1967). Instead, Frank proposes a complex communication process in which both author and reader actively create, shape, and reconstruct meanings. This echoes the even broader notion of dialogic meaning posited by the Russian philosopher and critic Mikhail Bakhtin in which language is understood as dynamic, contextual, intertextual, and relational (Holquist 1990). Acknowledging the textuality of intentional systems opens up understanding of system intentionality to a range of socially situated methods.

Intentional systems are not simply the result of clever algorithmic and data structural innovations. The AI practitioner and theorist Philip Agre cogently points out that the 'the purpose of AI is to build computer systems whose operation can be narrated using intentional vocabulary.' (Agre 1997) Michael Mateas, co-developer of Façade, further deconstructs the codes invoked in AI practice by computation, and definitions of system progress) and the co-existing 'code machine' (including physical processes, computational processes, and complex causal flow), in order to pin down the long-neglected social and discursive aspect of AI systems (Mateas 2002). In addition to considering actual computer programs, analysis of intentional systems should not omit the authors' publications, presentations, and interpersonal communication about the system. Such narrative outputs situate the system in AI research communities and frame users' interpretation, and therefore must be considered as part of the intentional system.

The AI Hermeneutic Network

The central contribution of this paper is the AI hermeneutic network model, enabled by theorizing intentional systems as texts. The interdisciplinary framework analyzes system intentionality as a result of a hermeneutic communication process that involves both authors' narrations and users' interpretations through interaction with both actual systems and authors' narrative output. In addition, this paper recognizes that intentional systems exist in broader social contexts that involve more than just authors and users. Animate and inanimate actors, called 'actants' in actor-network theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1996), participate in the network through multi-directional communication. Government and military funding, for instance, often plays a prominent role in determining direction and validity of different approaches of AI research.

Historically, hermeneutic studies developed interpretative theories and methods in order to recover the meanings of sacred texts intended by the (divine) author(s). Modern hermeneutics, influenced by Schleiermacher, recognizes that *everything* calls for the work of interpretation and broadens itself to the philosophical interrogation of interpretation (Virkler 1981). This paper highlights discursive 'elasticity' of the AI key words, such as planning (Agre 1997). He observes that these key terminologies are simultaneously precise (formal) and vague (vernacular), which allows AI practitioners to seamlessly integrate their everyday experience as embodied intentional being in the algorithmic research, and to narrate computation with popularly accessible ver-

nacular vocabulary.

One relatively unexplored aspect of this continuous negotiation of values and meanings between both human and computational actors (Latour 1996) is users' readings and interpretations of intentionality from systems that are clearly inanimate. For example, human coperformers and their audiences' interpretations of *Voyager*'s behaviors as intentional are central to construe the systems' status as an independent performer in its own right, as intended by its designer. Frank argues that '[i] n the understanding of its readers the text ... acquires a meaning which exceeds the memory of its origin.'(Frank 1989) Any analysis of system intentionality then is not adequate without considering participation of users and audiences.

This paper emphasizes the discursive strategy and semantic interpretation from a cognitive linguistics perspective. Conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier 2001; Fauconnier & Turner 2002; Turner 1996) offers a cognitive foundation for understanding system intentionality as actively (re)constructed by users via integrating concepts of intentionality based on encounters with animate agents, and conceptualization of algorithmic operation of inanimate computer systems. Thus, users compress the behavior of unfamiliar computational systems to human scale by constructing conceptual blends of systems with human-like intentionality, through semantic hooks that facilitate such blends in the various discourses surrounding the systems.

Conclusion: Design Implications of the AI Hermeneutic Network

The novel framework of the hermeneutic network suggests new design approaches for intentional systems in digital humanities. Our current interactive narrative work *Memory, Reverie Machine* generates stories in which the main character varies dynamically along a scale between a user-controlled avatar with low intentionality and an autonomous non-player character with high intentionality. By algorithmically controlling the semantic hooks for interpreting system behavior as intentional in the narrative discourse (Zhu & Harrell 2008), the authors turn system intentionality into a scalable expressive dimension in interactive storytelling (Harrell & Zhu 2009).

In conclusion, this paper proposes a new interdisciplinary framework to analyze intentional systems as social and cultural productions, as opposed to construing them as the domain of purely technical practices. It underlines authors' narrative and users' interpretative strategies, in a socially situated network of meaning exchange. Finally,

through our own computational work we suggest new design implications for intentional systems, such as the scale of intentionality (Zhu & Harrell 2008) that potentially can add new forms of expressivity to intentional systems in digital humanities.

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